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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 17 OcTOBma, 1964 NUmBER 4
Perpetuities: Cy Pres on the March
W. Barton Leach*
The application of the cy-pres doctrine to mitigate the destructiveness
of the Rule Against Perpetuities on non-charitable trusts was developed
in New Hampshire over seventy years ago and lay dormant, except in
the state of New Hampshire, for more than half a century. Professor
Leach here discusses the statutory and judicial development of the
New Hampshire doctrine during the period since 1954 and concludes
that the doctrine is now finding wider acceptance in both the legis-
latures and the courts.
Professor Austin W. Scott has enunciated the cy-pres doctrine as
applied to charitable trusts with his habitual clarity and precision:
Where property is given in trust for a particular charitable purpose, the
trust will not ordinarily fail even though it is impossible to carry out the
particular purpose. In such a case the court will ordinarily direct that the
property be applied to a similar charitable purpose. The theory is that the
testator would have desired that the property be so applied if he had realized
that it would be impossible to carry out the particular purpose. The courts
usually put it this way, that although the testator intended that the property
should be applied to the particular charitable purpose named by him, yet
he had a more general intention to devote the property to charitable pur-
poses. The settlor would presumably have desired that the property should
be applied to purposes as nearly as may be like the purposes stated by him
rather than that the trust should fail altogether.
The principle under which the courts thus attempt to save a charitable
trust from failure by carrying out the more general purpose of the testator
and carrying out approximately though not exactly his more specific intent
is called the doctrine of cy pres. The phrase is in the Anglo-French and
is equivalent to the modem French si pros, meaning so near or as near.
The intention of the testator is carried out as nearly as may be. . . . Ordi-
narily the court will refer the matter to a master with directions to report
a scheme of application of the property to the court. The court may accept
the scheme so proposed or may reject or modify it. . ... I
Story Professor of Law, Harvard University; LL.B., 1924, Harvard; member
Massachusetts Bar; author of books and articles on property and future interests, with
special emphasis on the Rule Against Perpetuities; co-author, American Law of
Property; and contributor to the Restatement of the Law of Property.
This article is being published concurrently in Perspectives of Law: Essays for
Austin Wakeman Scott (Little, Brown & Co. 1964).
1. 4 ScoTT, TRusTs § 399 (2d ed. 1956).
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As Scott points out, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1944 recommended a Model Act on the subject which in its first
clause, provides that the doctrine should apply, among other situa-
tions, if the expressed purpose of the trust "is or becomes illegal."
How admirably sensible! But why should this benignity of the
courts be limited to trusts for charity? In the indented quotation
from Scott the word "charitable" appears five times; just strike out
these quintuply repetitive words, read the passage again, and see
whether it doesn't make good jurisprudential sense. If you were
explaining Anglo-American law to a foreigner previously untutored
in the common law and read to him the Scott passage-with the five
"charitables" omitted-would you not expect him to nod his head in
approbation? Or, put it another way: Would you expect him to
gasp and exclaim, "Do you mean that you apply that principle to
family trusts as well as charitable trusts?" No such thing.
Actually a cy-pres doctrine has been applied at least twice in the
old and accepted law of property:
First, suppose A conveyed Blackacre "to B and his heirs, but if
B die without issue to C and his heirs." We know that "if B die
without issue" is given the indefinite construction-i.e., "if B's line of
issue runs out at any time either at his death or in any future genera-
tion." So the conveyance purported to create a fee simple in B,
subject to a shifting executory interest in C to take effect upon a
contingency which might occur in the indefinite future. Before the
Statute of Uses (1536) legal shifting executory interests in freehold
land were entirely forbidden: "a condition could not be reserved in
a stranger" is the way the rule was expressed. After the Statute of
Uses shifting interests could be created, but the expressed contin-
gency of B's line of issue running out would be an outrageous
violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities. The courts solved this very
sensibly, through an application of the cy-pres principle, by giving B
a fee tail, with remainder in fee simple to C.2
Secondly, the now-defunct rule in Whitby v. Mitchell prescribed
that after a limitation of land for life to an unborn person, any
further limitation to his issue was void, even though all limitations
would vest within lives in being and twenty-one years.3 Thus, where
A created an irrevocable inter vivos trust of land for B for life with
a special testamentary power of appointment among B's issue, and
2. Machell v. Weeding, 8 Sim. 4, 7, 59 Eng. Rep. 2, 3 (1836); 1 RESTATEMENT,
PoaPaTy § 61 (1936).
3. Whitby v. Mitchell, 42 Ch. D. 494 (1889), 44 Ch. D. 85 (C.A. 1890). For an




B by will appointed to his son S (unborn at the creation of the
trust) for life with remainders in tail male to S's first and other
sons living at the time of B's death, the remainders violated the rule
in Whitby v. Mitchell even though all interests were vested at the
death of B. But once more the English courts came to the rescue,
and this time they used the phrase cy pres or (sometimes) approxi-
mation: they gave S an estate in tail male which, if there were no
disentailment, would descend to S's sons in the manner B had in
mind.
4
Thus, if we must have precedents for developing sensible judicial
expedients in the face of threatened invalidity of a gift, we find at
least two having the attribute of respectable antiquity.
Now to the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The standard doctrine has been that where an interest may vest
too remotely the entire interest is stricken down; and this destruc-
tiveness is multiplied by the all-or-nothing rule of Leake v. Robin-
son5 which declares that the invalidity of a gift to any member of
a class invalidates the gifts of all other members.6
It is the thesis of this paper that the penalty for violation of the
Rule-a penalty inflicted, not on the violator, but on his or her in-
tended beneficiaries, usually minors or unborns-should be, not the
invalidation of the future interest, but rather a tailoring of the
interest on the principle of cy pres or approximation so that the
general intention of the settlor or testator is carried out so far as
possible within the limits of the Rule. Furthermore, I believe it is
demonstrable that this thesis is gaining acceptance in the courts
and the legislatures to the point where the time may be approach-
ing when the enormous destructiveness of the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities will be a thing of the past.
A chronology of the advance of cy-pres thinking is rather im-
pressive, especially since it comes to a climax, as of 1962, with the
decisions in Carter v. Berry from the Supreme Court of Mississippi
and In re Foster's Estate from the Supreme Court of Kansas.
In 1832 the English Commissioners on the Law of Real Property
in their Third Report recommended that where a gift violated the
Rule Against Perpetuities by reason of an age contingency in excess
of twenty-one (e.g., "to A for life remainder to A's children who shall
reach 25" where A is living when the gift takes effect) the contin-
gency should be reduced to twenty-one to save the gift. Gray
4. For further development of this cy-pres application, see MoRRS & LFMCi, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 261-65.
5. 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817).
6. For an exposition of the all-or-nothing rule and its exceptions, see 6 AMuRcAN
LAW OF PuoruT §§ 24.26 to -.29 (Gasner ed. 1952).
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thought this a very bad thing, offered five reasons why the proposal
was unsound,7 and in his second edition applauded the fact that
Parliament had declined to accept the recommendation. However,
Parliament did accept the recommendation in Section 163 of the
Law of Property Act, 1925,8 a fact which Gray's fourth edition briefly
acknowledges after repeating the negative arguments of the second
edition.9
In 1891 Edgerly v. Barker was decided by the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire, opinion by Chief Justice Doe.10 There was an initial
problem of construction, not material to the present discussion,
which the court resolved by deciding that the testator intended a
gift, after interests in his children, to the issue of the testator who
should be living when his youngest grandchild should reach the
age of forty. Since two children survived the testator, it was clear
that the gift violated the Rule. The New Hampshire Court held
that the age contingency should be cut down to twenty-one, thus
rendering the gift valid. Said Chief Justice Doe:
Within the legal limit, the testator's power of suspending the title is not
affected by the disability under which he labors beyond that limit. The
devise is effective cy pres, in pursuance of his implied intent to divide
according to common reason, throw out what is against law, and let the rest
stand .... 11
His intent that the grandchildren shall not have the remainder till the
youngest arrives at the age of forty years is modified by his intent that they
shall have it, and that the will shall take effect as far as possible. The forty
years are reduced to twenty-one by his general approximating purpose,
which is a part of the will.
12
Gray in his second and third editions (1906 and 1915 respectively),
thundered against this case in an appendix of fourteen pages,'
3
and few could doubt that the great authority of his name had a
7. GRAY, RU=E AcAINST FERPETu-IEs § 884n (2d ed. 1906).
8. 1925, 15 Geo. 688, c. 20, § 163. This section of the 1925 property legislation
is now incorporated in the compendious reforms of the Perpetuities and Accumulations
Act, 1964, Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 4. This statute is the outgrowth of the LAw RErorm
Co'rres FouaRT REPoRT (Cmnd. 18, 1956), which in turn bears certain similari-
ties to the recommendations of Moanes & LEAcH, THE RutL AGAMNST PEu'xcrus
(1956). Dr. Morris was "seconded," as our British cousins say, to the Committee for
the studies concerning this report. The 1964 act swept through Parliament without
opposition. Most of the debate comprised criticism of the government for having
delayed from 1956 to 1964. 256 HANsAWuo, LoRDs col. 246 (1964).
9. GnAY, op. cit. supra note 7, § 884n (4th ed. 1942).
10. 66 N.H. 434, 31 Adt. 900 (1891). This decision is vigorously supported in
Quarles, The Cy Pros Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule Against
Perpetuities and Trusts for Accumulation, 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 384 (1946).
11. 66 N.H. at 473, 31 Adt. at 915.
12. Id. at 475, 31 At. at 916.
13. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 857 to -93.
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potent effect in constricting this doctrine to the confines of New
Hampshire for more than half a century.
In 1925, as has been stated, Parliament finally enacted the statute
reducing invalid age contingencies to twenty-one.
In 1954-1955 the legislatures of Massachusetts, Maine and Con-
necticut enacted identical perpetuities reform statutes of which one
section copied the substance, though not the complex form, of section
163 of the English Law of Property Act of 1925.14 I was one of a
team who drafted this statute and nursed it through the Massachusetts
legislature (which we call the General Court) 5 In testifying before
the Senate Committee on Legal Affairs I had to offer substantial
argument to defend other portions of this bill, but not one member
of the legislature or of the lawyers' groups with whom we kept in
close contact questioned the soundness of the cy-pres section as to
age contingencies. The Maine and Connecticut legislatures adopted
the Massachusetts statute as a routine matter on the "consent" calen-
dars; I learned about the enactments through the mails some time
after the event. But it must be confessed that these age-contingency
statutes represent only a limited victory for the cy-pres principle.
They take care of a lot of the foolish cases-foolish either in the
inception due to ignorance of the testator or his attorney, or foolish
in decision due to inadequacies of a particular court-but they leave
a lot of cases outside the fold. If the cy-pres principle is sound
as to age contingencies, should it not be spread to other situations
which have arisen or which may arise in which (a) the general
purpose of the grantor, testator or settlor is reasonable and obvious
and (b) the manner in which he seeks to accomplish it oversteps the
limits of the Rule? I answer this question in the affirmative.
In 1957 the Vermont legislature enacted a statute which, in my
view, does the whole trick. It reads as follows:
Section 1. Rule against perpetuities: interest reformed to conform with
intent. Any interest in real or personal property which would violate the
rule against perpetuities shall be reformed, within the limits of that rule,
to approximate most closely the intention of the creator of the interest. In
determining whether an interest would violate said rule and in reforming
an interest the period of perpetuities shall be measured by actual rather than
possible events. 16
An Idaho statute of 1957 appears to aim at the same result as the
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-96 (1960); ME:. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 160, § 28
(Supp. 1961); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 184A, § 2 (1958).
15. See Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HAv. L. REv.
1349 (1954), reprinted as appendix II in LEAcH & TUDOR, THE RULE AGAINST PER-
rnmurrism 197 (1957).
16. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1959). See LEACH & TUDOR, op. cit. supra
note 15, app. IV.
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Vermont statute; but the aim is, shall we say, a little imprecise.
The statute will need clarification.1
7
In 1959 Washington enacted a statute, unique in form, providing
that a trust which would violate the Rule Against Perpetuities shall
be valid for the period of the Rule and that "the assets shall be then
distributed as the superior court having jurisdiction shall direct,
giving effect to the general intent of the creator of the trust."8
There appeared some published opposition to the Vermont form
of statute, to which I have referred elsewhere, 19 especially on the
matter of identifying the lives-in-being. I therefore applaud the
enactment of the same statute in Kentucky in 1960 with an addi-
tional provision that the lives-in-being must have "a causal rela-
tionship to the vesting or failure of the interest."20
It was also in 1960 that the Maryland and New York legislatures
adopted the Massachusetts form of statute, i.e., cy pres as to age
contingencies only.
21
Let us then summarize these cy-pres statutory developments over
the brief period from 1954 to 1960; and amazing it is that the
progress has been so great in so short a time, bearing in mind the
lack of political sex appeal in this recondite subject. Five states
(Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut, Maryland and New York) have
adopted the cy-pres statute reducing void age contingencies to
twenty-one pursuant to the example set in the English Law of
Property Act of 1925, section 163. Four more (Vermont, Idaho,
Washington and Kentucky) have adopted full-scale cy pres in all per-
petuities situations-with some doubts as to what the effect of the
Idaho statute will be. Additionally, it should be noted, eight of these
states, plus Pennsylvania, have adopted the wait-and-see principle
to a greater or less extent z thus permitting the court in perpetuities
cases to adjudicate validity on the basis of what actually has hap-
17. IDAnO CODE ANN. § 55-111 (1957).
18. WAsHr. R V. CODE ANN. § 11.98 (1963).
19. Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124
(1960).
20. Ky. REv. STAT. § 381.216 (1962). A detailed analysis of Kentucky perpetuities
law and the impact of the Kentucky statute appears in DuKENE, PmuErurrxms LAW
IN AcTioN; KENTUCKY CASE LAW AND =s 1960 REF om AcT (1962), originally
published in abbreviated form in 49 Ky. L.J. 1 (1960).
21. MD. ANx. CODE art. 16, 2 197A (1957); N.Y. REAL PRoP. LAW § 42b; N.Y.
PERSoNAL Pop. LAw § 11a.
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, 22 301.4, 301.5 (Purdon 1950). The non-conforming
state is New York, which has no wait-and-see provision.
23. The Vermont-type statutes go all out for full wait-and-see by requiring that the
interest by adjudged "by actual rather than possible events"-a phrase taken from the
Pennsylvania Estates Act of 1947, the pioneer in this field. The Massachusetts-type
statutes permit wait-and-see for the duration of relevant lives-in-being, MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 184A, § 1 (1958), but this will take care of a very large percentage
of possible perpetuities violations.
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pened instead of what might have happened. 24 Furthermore, at long
last New York has abandoned its unworkable two-life limit on sus-
pension of the power of alienation and has adopted the common-law
period of lives in being plus twenty-one years.25
On the judicial front there have been, over the years, some rather
striking relaxations of the "remorseless" (Gray's word) traditional
applications of the Rule. In 1950 it was finally established in In re
Walker's Will2 that there is no restriction on the duration of private
trusts in Wisconsin or on the vesting of interests therein .so long as
the trustee has the power of sale-and one will be implied if it is
not expressed.27 In 1952 Sears v. Coolidge2 8 held that where the
settlor of an irrevocable inter vivos trust has any power to amend,
the gifts in default of amendment must be adjudicated on the basis
of facts existing when the power of amendment is lost either by
release or by death of the settlor-a holding which applies the wait-
and-see principle automatically to all gifts in default of appointment.
In 1953 Merchants National Bank v. Curtis29 put New Hampshire
in the full-scale wait-and-see column without benefit of legislation,
declaring that "the court should not be compelled to consider only
what might have been and completely ignore what was."
It remained for the 1962 Mississippi court, however, to strike the
most devastating blows at two of those applications of the Rule
Against Perpetuities which have been the target of the Rule's critics.
In Carter v. Berry30 the will of one Johnston presented a series
of problems quite similar to those which the New Hampshire court
faced in 1891 in Edgerly v. Barker. The testator directed that his
trust should continue until his youngest grandchild "whether now
living or hereafter born" should reach twenty-five, and should then be
distributed among his grandchildren. The will was contested by the
testator's two daughters, whom he had expressly excluded from the
gift on the ground of adequate provision during his lifetime. The
24. The wait-and-see principle was also endorsed by the Lord Chancellor's Law
Reform Committee. See recommendation No. 5 in LAW Rosu Cowvnm=rE, FOURTH
REPoRT 30 (Cmnd. 18, 1956). It became the law of the realm in section 3 of the
Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, Eliz. 2, c. 55. Meanwhile, in December,
1962 the State of Western Australia enacted a bill of considerable complexity based on
the Committee's recommendations and vigorous steps are being taken in Wellington
to have a similar act passed by the New Zealand legislature. W. Austl. Act No. 83 of
1962.
25. N.Y. REA. PRoPERTY LAw § 42; N.Y. PERsoNA r ProPERTY LAw § 11.
26. 258 Wis. 65, 45 N.W.2d 94 (1950).
27. The same may be true in Idaho under IDnao CODE Arx. § 55-11 (1957). For
a discussion of the Wisconsin and Idaho situations, see CAsNmE, ESTATE PLANrNMG
(3d ed. 1961).
28. 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E.2d 563 (1952).
29. 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953).
30. 243 Miss. 321, 140 So. 2d 843 (1962).
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case could have been disposed of by a holding that the gifts to
grandchildren vested at birth subject to postponed enjoyment; and
at several points in the opinion of Mr. Justice Ethridge the court
seemed on the point of so holding. But the gifts to grandchildren
were finally ruled to be contingent. Surely, then, by the all-or-nothing
rule traditionally applied to gifts to classes the whole limitation
to grandchildren must fail. Yet the court refused so to bold. It
considered two possibilities:
(a) holding the gift valid as to living grandchildren though in-
valid as to after-born grandchildren,
(b) reducing the age contingency to twenty-one and thus making
the gift valid as to all grandchildren.
The court adopted alternative (b), thus reducing to dicta its re-
marks on alternative (a); but the vehemence of its pronouncement
on the all-or-nothing rule is such that this opinion must be considered
a major breakthrough in perpetuities doctrine. Said the court:
In support of the trial court's decree, appellees rely upon the all-or-
nothing rule in class gifts. The source of the doctrine is the leading English
case of Leake v. Robinson (2 Mer. 363)....
In brief, the English rule is that, if the interest of one class member can
possibly vest too remotely, the entire class gift must fail .... The subsequent
history of that rule in England "can be described in two words: stare
decisis."....
Whether we should follow the rule of Leake v. Robinson is a de novo,
open question in this jurisdiction ...
If we should apply the all-or-nothing rule to the trust created by Johnston's
will, the result would be invalidation of the entire gift to testator's grand-
children, and inheritance of the estate by his daughters for whom he had
already provided, and whose participation in his estate he expressly excluded
because of earlier provisions for them. The dominant idea of the entire will
is that testator's grandchildren shall have the bulk of his estate. His determi-
nation that his daughters shall not have it is manifest....
The question is whether, as a de novo proposition in this jurisdiction, we
should follow Leake v. Robinson and its successors from other jurisdictions,
or adopt a different rule. In the immense literature of primary and sec-
ondary authorities discussing and frequently applying that case, we have
found no satisfactory rationalization for it ....
The all-or-nothing rule ignores the proposition that the problem is one
of separability, not of perpetuities; a question of construction, not of appli-
cation of a rule of law. There is no reason to totally amputate an arm in
order to save an infected finger. The general dispositive intent should
control. The court should save such parts of the gift as the rigid require-
ments of the rule do not strike down, provided such action carries out the
testator's principal purpose. This approach will preserve the policy of the
rule, and at the same time preserve so far as may be the intention of
testator. ..
The common law should be but is not always a product of rational
processes and growth. This question is new in this jurisdiction. We decline
1388 [ VOL. 17
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to adopt the patent anomaly and ill-considered doctrine of Leake v. Robinson
and its successors. It is not good logic or sound law.31
Then proceeding to its ultimate holding, the court relied heavily upon
Edgerly v. Barker, adopted its cy-pres solution of reducing the age
contingency to twenty-one and declared:
The second alternative to prevent failure in toto of a class gift which is
partially invalid is supported by reasoned precedents which we think are
pertinent to this will. It is the saving principle of cy pres or equitable
approximation as applied to testamentary gifts ... 140 So.2d at 852.
The doctrine of equitable approximation is a basic part of equity jurisdic-
tion .... It should be applied here. Moreover, it is logical and equitable.
Appellees want us to strike down the dominant idea of the entire will,
that testator's grandchildren should have the bulk of his estate, and thereby
to vest it in his daughters, despite his manifest intent that they should not
have it. The time when the grandchildren should have the estate was
secondary and subordinate to the intent that they should receive it.
Appellees seek to overthrow this dominant idea and have the trust
declared entirely void for remoteness, because testator was unable to post-
pone the vesting of the property for as long as he wished, when the
youngest grandchild, born and unborn, shall become twenty-five years of
age. If he had said, "when my youngest grandchild (whether now living
or hereafter born) shall become twenty-one years of age", the validity
of the devise to them could not be questioned. The issue is one of
separability and of interpretation, not of arbitrary application of a rule of law.
If an examination of the testator's will in the light of the circumstances in
which it was written leads to the conclusion that his general dispositive
intent would be better carried out by invalidating the gift in toto, rather
than reducing the age contingency to twenty-one within the period of
perpetuities, then the entire gift should fail. But that circumstance does
not exist in this case.
Here as in Edgerly v. Barker testator's dominant intent should be
effectuated, to give his grandchildren the bulk of his estate. The intent that
they should have it when the youngest reached twenty-five was only
secondary. The latter is subordinate to the former. That which is dominant
should be carried out by an adjudication, under the doctrine of equitable
approximation, that the estate shall be distributed to testator's grandchildren
when the youngest reaches twenty-one years of age. This adjudication
rejects no more of the will than the law makes it necessary to reject. The
time is changed by an intended approximation, because this is an ascertain-
ment of his intent. The will is not invalidated beyond the bounds of
necessity. The twenty-five years are reduced to twenty-one by testator's
general approximating purpose and dominant intent.3 2
Later in 1962 In re Fostes Estate came before the Supreme
Court of Kansas.33 Testatrix bequeathed a share of income to her
daughter and sole heir, Miriam, and then provided that the prin-
31. Id. at 359-68, 140 So. 2d at 846-52. The opinion contains such a num-
ber of references to the works of the present writer that a more modest man might
be deterred from referring to the case at all.
32. Id. at 370-77, 140 So. 2d at 852-55.
33. 190 Kan. 498, 376 P.2d 784 (1962).
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cipal should be distributed at the death of Miriam or at the time
the youngest child of Miriam should reach twenty-three, whichever
happened later. All parties agreed that the gifts to testatrix's grand-
children were contingent upon surviving to the date of distribution.
By standard doctrine the court would wait and see which contingency
happened later-the death of Miriam or her youngest child attaining
twenty-three-then, if all children were twenty-three at the death
of Miriam the gift would be valid, but if all were not twenty-three
the gift would fail.34 By the doctrine of Edgerly v. Barker and Carter
v. Berry (neither of which was cited in any of the three opinions),
the age contingency would have been reduced to twenty-one. But
the majority of the Kansas court took a still third course: it excised
the clause as to the youngest child reaching twenty-three, thus
causing the gift to pass to all children of Miriam living at her death.
The majority opinion talks the language of cy pres without using
the phrase. The two dissenting judges inveigh against "making a
new will for the testatrix" and one of them makes the unguarded
statements that the court is adopting an "unusual rule . . . followed
by no other court in the country" and that the court's conclusion
"has no precedent in this jurisdiction or elsewhere to sustain it."
Possibly these negative statements (always risky) can be sustained,
but one may doubt that they would have been used if Edgerly v.
Barker and Carter v. Berry had been before the mind of the dissenting
justice.5
It is odd that the cy-pres principle of Edgerly v. Barker should
have lain dormant for nearly seventy years except in cases governed
by the laws of New Hampshire.3 One might have expected that
the sheer common sense of the matter would have impressed courts
as much as it clearly has impressed legislators on both sides of the
Atlantic. Is it too much to hope that, now that the Mississippi and
Kansas courts have re-broken the judicial ice and numerous state
legislatures have now declared themselves in favor of some form of the
cy-pres principle as applied to private trusts, other courts may find
themselves inclined to follow the New Hampshire-Mississippi-Kansas
lead?3
7
34. The doctrine of separable limitations (or split contingencies) is expounded
in 6 AMEcA r LA-w OF PRoPERTY § 24.54 (Casner ed. 1952), and GRAY, op. cit.
supra note 7, §§ 331 to -68.
35. The case has an unusual feature in that the majority opinion was written by
Justice Jackson (apparently on assignment by the Chief Justice), and then it was
Jackson who dissented most vehemently from his own opinion.
36. These include one Kentucky case involving the will of a New Hampshire
resident. Hussey v. Sargent, 116 Ky. 53, 75 S.W. 211 (1903).
37. A short dissertation on the extent to which courts can, and do, use statutes
as precedents for judicial action appears in Lzcu & TuDon, op. cit. supra note 15, app.
V, at 231.
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